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Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas
Kathryn Toffenetti*
On January 1, 1984, almost all the national forest wilderness
areas were withdrawn from mineral claim location.Like any public
land withdrawa4 however, this withdrawal under the Wilderness
Act of 1964 was subject to "valid rights then existing."A mining
claim can still be located in a wilderness area if a claimant can
show that his claim satisfied all of the elements of location on the
date of withdrawal.
In this article,the authorexamines the elements of claim location, especially the discovery element. She analyzes decisions of
the Departmentof the Interiorand the federal courts in order to
ascertain the InteriorDepartment'sdiscovery test. She then explains how wilderness designation has affected and will affect a
claimant's ability to prove that he has discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on or before the date of withdrawal.
It is difficult to imagine two more incompatible uses of federal land
than mining and wilderness preservation. Although the policies behind
permitting these uses seem completely opposed, there are many thousands
of mining claims in national forest wilderness areas.' Mining interests have
*Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Division, Office of the Attorney General, U.S.D.A.;
B.A., 1975, University of Chicago; J.D., 1979, University of Illinois; M.S., 1984, Natural
Resource Management, University of Idaho.
This article is an adaptation of the author's master's thesis and does not necessarily
reflect the views of the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.D.A.
1. There are no exact figures available for the total number of claims in wilderness
areas. Some Forest Service regions, however, have estimated the number of claims within
their wilderness areas. The estimates are as follows: 1,226 in Region 1 (Northern Region).
Letter from Buster Lamoure, Director of Minerals and Geology, Northern Region (Aug. 4,
1984); 2,270 in Region 3 (Southwest Region). Letter from M.J. Hassell, Regional Forester,
Southwest Region (Aug. 3, 1983; 552 in Region 6 (Pacific Northwest Region). Letter from
David Scott, Director of Recreation, Pacific Northwest Region (Aug. 2, 1983); 4,346 in Region
10 (Alaska Region). Letter from John Sandor, Regional Forester to Forest Supervisors, Alaska
Region (April 4, 1983). Amy Haak, a graduate student in geography at the University of
Idaho, has made a study of the mining claims in wilderness in parts of Idaho and Montana
which are in Region 4 (Intermountain Region). She has counted approximately 1,950 claims
in these areas. Interview with Amy Haak (Nov., 1983). Figures are not available for Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada or California.
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been accommodated on wilderness land through the mining exception to
the Wilderness Act of 1964.2 Until January 1, 1984, mining claims could
be staked and mineral exploration undertaken in many national forest
wilderness areas. After that date, no new claims could be established 3 and
further exploration became unlawful. As with all mining land withdrawals,
however, the withdrawal of wilderness areas was "subject... to valid
rights then existing."4 A claim that was valid on January 1, 1984, the
date of withdrawal, may be developed and mined.
The requirements for a valid right in a mining claim have been in contention since passage of the mining law. A reexamination of these requirements is timely today because over the next few years many claimants
will attempt to validate pre-1984 wilderness claims.
In this article, I will review the origin of the wilderness mining exception, the meaning of a valid right under the mining law, and the proof
required to establish that right. Although the Wilderness Act's mining
exception applies to both mineral location5 and leasing, I will be concerned
only with the former, that is, mining activities subject to the 1872 Mining Law.
MINING, WILDERNESS, AND THE WILDERNESS

Acr

Mineral development and wilderness preservation represent two inconsistent policies held by the federal government in its administration
of the public lands. The older policy, of which the Mining Law is a part,
focuses on developing the nation's natural wealth. Wilderness preservation is part of a later policy to conserve and preserve land.
Early in our history the federal government recognized the advantages
of putting public lands into private ownership. The federal government
paid its debts in land' and raised cash by selling land.7 The government
recognized, too, that transfer of the public domain into private hands
helped the nation's economy grow. 8
The federal mineral policy was developed in this era of land disposal
and shaped by the government's acquiescence to the private appropriation of public domain during the gold rushes. The Mining Law of 1872
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(d)(2), (3), 1134(b) (1982). The story of the mining exception's inclusion in the Wilderness Act is told in J. Hession, The Legislative History of the Wilderness
Act (1967) (San Diego State College, unpublished M.A. thesis). See also McCloskey, The
WildernessAct of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 ORE. L. REv. 288-321 (1966). See
also R. NAsH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d ed. 1982).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).

4. 1d
5. Location is the means by which one acquires the right to mine under the Mining
Law of 1872. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). In general, it pertains to the right to mine non-fuel, nonfertilizer minerals on public or national forest lands.
6. See, e.g., Act of August 10, 1790, ch. 40, 1 Stat. 182 (1790). This act provided for
bounties of Ohio Territory land to Virginia veterans of the Revolutionary War.
7. See, e.g., Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (1790). Proceeds from the sale
of lands of the western territories were to be used to discharge debts of the United States.
8. C. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 3-5 (1982).
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simply made official what had been done for years without authorization.9
The Mining Law declared that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the United States ... shall be free and open to exploration
and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and
purchase ... under regulations prescribed by law."' 0
The statute has been amended in some respects and it now begins with
the cautionary words, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided,"" but it remains
the policy of the federal government to permit citizens to go upon federal
lands to search for, discover, and develop valuable mineral deposits for
their personal benefit."3 By the time Congress passed the Wilderness Bill,
the mining industry had long been accustomed to entering, exploring, and
mining the public lands.
The concept of wilderness preservation began later, and developed
more slowly, than the Mining Law philosophy.' 3 In the colonial era and
the early years of the republic, wilderness was so frighteningly vast that
few thought it might need protection. Only when people were not surrounded by wilderness did they consider preserving it." The federal government,
engrossed in its policy of national development, was slow to respond. It
first acted by establishing Yellowstone National Park in 1872. I1 More
parks followed, but the greatest opportunity for wilderness preservation
occurred within the millions of acres of the National Forest System.'" The
first wilderness area was established by a district forester in the Gila National Forest in 1924.'1 By the Wilderness Act's passage in 1964, the National Forest System contained over 14.6 million acres of wilderness, wild,
and primitive areas."
9. The history of federal minerals policy is told in P.

GATES & R. SWENSON, HISTORY
(1968).
10. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152 §§ 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (18721 (current version
at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1976)).
OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT

11. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
12. See Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970, § 2, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1976).
13. See R. NASH, supra note 2, for an account of the development of a preservation
attitude in America.
14. As early as 1832, George Catlin, who recorded the lives of Plains Indians in paintings and writings, suggested a "magnificent park" in the northern plains to preserve the
Indians, buffalo, and their wilderness. R. NASH, supra note 2, at 101.
15. Act of March 1, 1872, ch.24, 17 Stat. 32 (1872) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1982)).
16. Section 24 of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1103 (1891) (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1982)) (repealed 1976), provided a mechanism whereby the President could
reserve timber lands. The Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 20 Stat. 34 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 476-482
(1982)) established the National Forest System.

17. G. ROBINSON,
(1975).

THE FOREST SERVICE, A STUDY IN PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT

18. Aspinall, UnderlyingPrinciplesof Wilderness Legislationas I See Them,
ING WILDERNESS,

THE

157
Liv-

Spring-Summer 1964, at 6-9.

"Wilderness" areas, which could only be designated by the Secretary of Agriculture,
were areas consisting of 100,000 acres or more. "Wild" areas, which could be designated
by the Chief of the Forest Service, contained less than 100,000 acres. "Primitive" areas were
those areas for which the Forest Service had not made a final determination of status but
which were being preserved as wilderness pending permanent classification. G. ROBINSON,
supra note 17, at 161.
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Agency designation of wilderness had its drawbacks, however. The
Forest Service, for example, was unable to abrogate the statutory right
to prospect, explore, and mine in national forests. 9 Only Congress could
withdraw these areas from operation of the mining laws. 0
A statutory wilderness system was first proposed in 1947,1 but it was
not until 1956 that the first wilderness bills were introduced by Hubert
Humphrey of Minnesota in the Senate and John Saylor of Pennsylvania
in the House of Representatives.22 It would take eight years, and twenty
House bills before wilderness
different versions of sixty-six Senate and
23
areas were given statutory protection.
Immediate withdrawal of wilderness areas from operation of the Mining Law was an obvious measure through which Congress could retain
the "primeval character and influence"24 of those areas and make the imprint of man's work "substantially unnoticeable. ' 2 1 But the mineral industry proved to be a formidable force in the debate over wilderness
management and it found a sympathetic audience in the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Enthusiasm for a wilderness bill was
noticeably lacking among many committee members whose constituents
were often engaged in industries dependent upon federal lands. 2 6 With this
committee controlling the House wilderness legislation, immediate
withdrawal was out of the question. Instead, the bill which was reported
out of the committee and passed by the House in July of 1964, authoand mineral leasing laws in
rized the continued operation of the mining
27
wilderness areas for twenty-five years.
The Senate wilderness bill, by contrast, had provided for immediate
withdrawal. 6 At the conference to reconcile the two bills, the Senate con19. For wilderness advocates, other disadvantages of relying on the Forest Service to
preserve wilderness were the slow pace of agency classification after World War II, hostility by some within the Forest Service toward permanent reservation of lands from development, and the Forest Service practice of removing valuable timber lands from primitive areas
(often through acre for acre exchanges of valuable valley timber lands for lands above timberline). Skepticism grew about the Forest Service's willingness to permanently preserve
lands in the face of a growing demand for forest products. G. ROBINsON,supra note 17, at 158.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 478(1982) specifically provided that those national forests reserved from
land subject to the mining laws, that is, formed from public lands, were to remain subject
to mineral entry. In general, the result was that western national forests were open to mining. Eastern national forests, formed from acquired lands, were never open to mining. Acquired lands are "those granted or sold to the United States by a State or citizen .... Wallis
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 65 n.2 (1966).
21. J. Hession, The Legislative History of the Wilderness Act 7 (1967) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, San Diego State College which recounts the long effort to establish a statutory
wilderness system). See also McCloskey, supra note 2, at 288-321; Mercure & Ross, The
Wilderness Act: A Product of CongressionalCompromise, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54-55 (R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-Smith ed. 1970).
22. Humphrey, The Wilderness Bill, 21 THE LIVING WILDERNESS, Winter-Spring
1956-57, at 13.
23. McCloskey, supra note 2, at 298.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982).
25. id.
26. Mercure & Ross, supra note 21, at 54-55.
27. Hession, supra note 21, at 204.
28. Id. at 174.
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ferees gave more ground than did the House conferees and the resulting
Wilderness Act provided for operation of the mining laws to the same extent as before wilderness designation, until midnight, December 31, 1983.29
The Wilderness Act designated as wilderness the fifty-four "wild,"
"wilderness," and "canoe" areas in the National Forest System. 0 By
January 1, 1984, 215 wilderness areas and additions to existing wilderness
areas had been added from the National Wildlife Refuge System, and the
National Park System, as well as the National Forest System.3 1
All the units in the National Park System and the National Wildlife
Refuge System that contained wilderness areas were closed to mining
before any of their lands were designated as wilderness. The mining exception thus has no application to these areas.2 Eastern national forests
and their wilderness areas are also not subject to the mining laws. 33
The mining exception was incorporated into most western national
forest wilderness areas as they were added to the system,34 but there were
some exceptions. The Sawtooth and Hell's Canyon Wilderness areas and
their surrounding national recreation areas were withdrawn from operation of the mining laws on the dates they were established. 5 The Boundary Waters Canoe Area in northern Minnesota was withdrawn from mining in 1978.36 The Misty Fjords and Admiralty Island National Monuments of Alaska and their wilderness areas, administered by the Forest
Service, were established
on December 2, 1980, and withdrawn from min37
ing on the same day.
In two Idaho wilderness areas, the mining exception was modified to
the advantage of the mining industry. In the Gospel Hump Wilderness,
created by the Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, withdrawal
is not until January 1, 1988.8 The River of No Return Wilderness was
created with a "Special Management Zone" within which there will be
29. Id. at 206; 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).
30. The National Wilderness PreservationSystem. LIVING WILDERNESS, Spring-Summer
1964, at 19, 23.
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
32. Most of the components of the National Park System (including national monuments)
were withdrawn from entry under the mining laws from the time they were added to that
system. Their inclusion into the wilderness system did not affect this. Opinion of the Solicitor,
The Wilderness Act, 74 I.D. 97, 104 (1967). The few exceptions were closed to entry in 1976
before any part within them became designated wilderness. Those areas of the National
Wildlife Refuge System designated wilderness were withdrawn from mining before their inclusion in the wilderness system. Their designation as wilderness did not reopen them to
operation of the mining law. Id
33. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 599-600 (1922); Rawson v. United States, 225
F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956).
34. See, e.g., Act of October 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-546 § 3, 92 Stat. 2062 (1978)
(designating the Great Bear Wilderness, Montana).
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460aa-1, -9 (1982) (Sawtooth National Recreation Area and Wilderness);
16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg-1, -8 (1982) (Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area and Wilderness).
36. Act of October 21, 1978, Pub. Law No. 95-495 § 11, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
37. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. Law No. 96-487, § 503(f)(1),
94 Stat. 2370 (1980). The Act permits continued exploration under certain circumstances
on claims staked but not yet proved valid.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-237, § 5, 92 Stat. 40 (1978).
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no withdrawal from mining with respect to cobalt and associated
minerals.3 9
For the most part, mineral exploration in wilderness areas ceased on
January 1, 1984. The withdrawal is "subject to valid rights then existing,"
however.40 Wilderness claims valid on January 1, 1984 may be developed.
Whether a valid right has been acquired is determined by the Mining Law.
ESTABLISHMENT OF VALID RIGHTS IN MINING CLAIMS

"Valid Rights then Existing"
It is well established that as against all others, including the United
States, one acquires a right to develop a mineral deposit only upon "location" of a valid claim." Location is a four-part process in which a miner
must discover a valid mineral deposit, monument the claim's boundary
on-site, record the claim at the county courthouse, and file notice of the
claim with the pertinent Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Office.42 The
intent behind the Mining Law is that discovery occur first and monumenting later, but as a practical matter, monumenting usually occurs first.
The location is not valid, however, until discovery. 3
With valid location, one acquires the exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment of the mineral deposit discovered." Upon performance of a certain amount of labor on the claim and payment of a nominal sum per acre,
39. Pub. L. No. 96-312, § 5(d), 94 Stat. 948 (1980).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982). Withdrawal of land or minerals from mineral entry
is not a novelty, and it is customary for a withdrawal to except valid existing rights from
operation of the withdrawal. For example, the Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat.
368 (1955) (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1976)), withdrew common varieties of minerals
from operation of the mining laws, and Pub. Land Order No. 848 withdraw an area in Yuma
County, Arizona from operation of the mining laws for the use of the Department of the
Army. See United States v. Connor, 72 IBLA 254 (1983). A right established before withdrawal
continues thereafter as long as the requirements of the Mining Law are met.
41. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 344, 346 (1919).
42. Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 296 (1920); 30 U.S.C. §§ 23, 27-28 (1976); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1744 (1976). 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1976) requires compliance with state laws, all of which require
recording of claims. Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982), has added the requirement of filing mining claims in the pertinent
BLM office. Only three states, New Mexico, Colorado, and North Dakota, now require what
is called discovery work. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 69-3-3 to -4 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §
34-43-109 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-2-04 to -06 (1980).
43. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 344, 346 (1919). It has also been suggested
that a claim should be considered valid when a discovery has not been made. "A valid mining claim is an unpatented lode or placer claim which has a... discovery ...or is being

held by the doctrine of pedis possessio .... "Letter from H. L. Bauer, Jr., Amoco Minerals
Co. to Director of the BLM (February 25, 1983) (suggestion for revision of BLM regulations
on the mining laws) (emphasis added).
44. 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). Right of possession in this paper refers to that right which
results from discovery and which is good against the whole world, including the federal government. This not to be confused with the doctrine of pedis possessio (possession of a foothold)
which protects a prospector exploring a claim from encroachment by other explorers. The
doctrine holds that "upon the public domain a miner may hold the place in which he may
be working against all others having no better right, and while he remains in possession,
diligently working towards discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected against forcible, fraudulent, and clandestine intrusions upon his possession." Union
Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1919).
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one may also obtain a patent, or title, to the land. 5 Location of a valid
claim is sufficient, however, to establish a right to mine and to exempt
the claim from withdrawal. The right will exist as long as yearly assessment work is performed, and as long as the mineral deposit remains
valuable. 6 A claim can lose its value through changed circumstances such
as loss of a market for
the mineral, a decline in mineral prices, or exhaus4
tion of the deposit. 1
It is easy to ascertain whether a claimant has monumented, recorded, or filed his claim, because evidence of these tasks is generally clear."
The satisfaction of the discovery requirement, however, is more difficult
to prove.
Discovery Procedure
The Mining Law of 1872 simply states that there must be a discovery
of a valuable mineral deposit before there can be a valid location.49 But
"valuable mineral deposit" and "discovery" are not defined in the statute
nor in the mining regulations. The meaning of these concepts has been
developed in case law. 50
For the most part, the case law has grown within the BLM, which
administers the Mining Law.' Claim contests are heard by administrative
law judges in the Offices of Hearings and Appeals which are located in
BLM state offices.
45. 30 U.S.C. §§ 28-29 (19761. Under the Mining Law, a patent gives the claimant fee
simple title to the claim. Upon obtaining a patent the claimant could then make any use
of the property, deposit, and surface. The Mining Law applies, "except as otherwise provided," however, and the Wilderness Act modifies the patenting provision considerably. The
Wilderness Act provides that a patent for a wilderness claim conveys title to the mineral
deposit only. Use of other resources on the claim is permissible only as needed for mining
operations. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982). Apparently the sole advantage to patenting a
wilderness claim is that such a claim is free from future challenge to its validity.
46. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); United States v.
Colonna and Co. of Colorado, 14 IBLA 220, 226 (1974). Assessment work is required by 30
U.S.C. § 28 (1976).
47. United States v. Wichner, 35 IBLA 240, 241 (1978).
48. Under unusual circumstances these matters can become significant issues. March
& King, Staking Mineral Claims on Revoked Public Land Withdrawals: Issues and Alternative Strategies, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (publication pending 1984).

49. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976).

50. In December, 1982, the BLM, which administers the mining law and adjudicates
issues of claim validity, announced its intention to revise regulations dealing with acquisition of rights and development of mineral resources under the Mining Law. 47 Fed. Reg.
57,521 (1982). Possibilities for revision included the addition of definitions, consistent with
existing case law, of "discovery," "valuable mineral deposit," "valid mining claim," and
the showing required to support a mining claimant's allegation of discovery. 47 Fed. Reg.
57,522 (1982). The tentative publication date of these proposed rules is March, 1985. Telephone
conversation with Roger Haskins, staff geologist, Division of Mining Law and Salable
Minerals, BLM (July 20, 1984).
51. This is true even for national forests. When jurisdiction over the national forests
was transferred to the Department of Agriculture from the Department of the Interior, excepted from the Secretary of Agriculture's duties was the execution of laws that affected
"the surveying, prospecting, locating, appropriating, entering, relinquishing, reconveying,
certifying or patenting of such lands." 16 U.S.C. § 472 (1982). Correspondence between the
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture and the case law have left no question that the
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When a disputed claim is on Forest Service land, a working arrangement between the BLM and the Forest Service, recorded in a 1957 memorandum of understanding,2 operates. Under the arrangement, Forest Service mineral examiners investigate the claim. If the Forest Service recommends contesting the claim, then the BLM will honor that recommendation.5 3 A Department of Agriculture attorney represents the government
in the case."4
In a contest hearing, the government must make a prima facie showing of claim invalidity. The claimant then bears the burden of showing
that the claim is in fact valid.5 Where there has been a withdrawal of an
area from mineral entry (such as a withdrawal that has occurred for
wilderness areas) the claimant must show that his claim was valid at the
time of the withdrawal and that it is still valid at the time of the hearing. 6
Appeals by the government or claimant may be brought to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 7 The decision of this body is final and
binding upon the government, but an unsuccessful private litigant may
seek judicial review in a United States district court.5"
Discovery for Location and Patent
Before we examine the case law on discovery, we must consider the
argument made by some commentators that there should be two levels
of discovery. Many contend that the standard of discovery to establish
valid rights to claims should be less strict than the standard required for
patents.5 9 In wilderness areas, a relatively lenient location standard would
be necessary to allow mining development for some claims and thereby
allow claimants to profit from their exploration investments. 0
Secretary of the Interior alone is authorized to determine the validity of national forest mining claims. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON WORK PROCEDURES GOVERNING ACTION
ON APPLICATIONS OR CLAIMS FOR LANDS WITHIN NATIONAL FORESTS, FOREST SERVICE MANUAL

§ 1531.2 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]; United States v. Bergdal, 74 I.D.
245, 250 (1967).
52. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51.
53. United States v. Bergdal, 74 I.D. 245 (1967).
54. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at A(10.
55. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v. Strauss, 59
I.D. 129, 136 (1945).
56. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); United States v. Gunsight Mining Co., 5 IBLA 62, 64 (1972).
57. The IBLA has been in existence since 1970. From 1952 until 1970 the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior handled appeals, and before 1952 the Secretary of the Interior issued final decisions of the department. Anderson, FederalMineralPolicy: The General
Mining Law of 1872, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 604-05 (1976).
58. Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of InteriorDepartmentProcedures,
1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 251. Although it is typical for litigation involving the validity of
claims to originate before a BLM administrative law judge, the government has the option
of instituting suits in federal district court, to quiet title or for ejectment. These actions
require a decision regarding the validity of claims on the land that is the subject of the litigation. United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975).
59. See, e.g., Letter from Robin L. Rivett, Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, to Robert
Burford, Director, Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 2, 1983) [hereinafter Rivett Letter].
60. Comments made in response to a BLM proposal to revise mining regulations reflect
a concern for the fate of mining claims in withdrawn areas, including wilderness. See supra

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss1/2

8

Toffenetti: Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas
1985

VALID MINING RIGHTS AND WILDERNESS AREAS

Many commentators agree that the level of discovery required for
patenting a claim should be set quite high. Their opinions vary, however,
on the level of discovery that should be required to establish a valid location. Suggested standards for location discovery range from a mere inference of minerals indicated by geological data, 1 to a standard nearly
as strict as that required to prove discovery in patenting applications."'
Prior to 1960, the Interior Department frequently denied patents for
lack of discovery without voiding the underlying claims. A claim could
be valid for location purposes but not for patenting purposes. The Department apparently employed a lesser standard of discovery for claim location than it did for the grant of patents. In United States v. Carlile,63 a
1960 Interior decision, the Department reversed its policy and held that
the same evidence of discovery is necessary to establish a valid location
as is required for a patent.
Commentators have criticized the Carlile decision as a poorly considered change of policy, 64 but that criticism is unwarranted. The Mining
Law, not just Interior Department policy, requires a single standard of
discovery.
In Carlile, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior analyzed
the process by which miners obtained patents on mineral lands. He traced
the process from exploration of the public lands for minerals, through acquisition of the right to mine upon valid location, to acquisition of fee simple title by patent. He concluded that when patent applications were rejected for lack of discovery, it was because the claimants had not acquired
a valid location entitling them to possession in the first place. The very
discovery required for valid location of a claim served as evidence of discovery when that claim went to patent. Because there was only one discovery finding in the entire process, there could be only a single discovery
standard.
The Solicitor traced the history of the double standard and found that
it was not well supported by judicial precedent. He found that the double
standard of discovery had originated in the Clipper Mining Company
note 50. One rather surprising holder of this concern is the former Alaska Regional Forester,
John A. Sandor, who wrote the BLM:
[W]e suggest that you consider adopting new regulations which would ... allow
diligent explorations to continue on promising prospects after the December
31, 1983 withdrawal date; even if "discovery" of a valuable mineral deposit
This of course, will involve a new standard for
has not yet been made ....
establishing valid existing rights in wilderness.
Letter from John A. Sandor, Regional Forester, Alaska Region, to Robert Burford, Director, BLM (April 13, 1983).
61. Letter from E.A. Johnson, geological engineer, to William Condit, BLM (March
21, 1983).
62. Letter from S.A. Hoelscher, geologist, to Robert Burford, Director, BLM (Jan. 24,
1983).
63. 67 I.D. 417, 426 (1960).
64. Criticisms of Carlile among the BLM's request for comments included Reeves, The
Law of Discovery in a Nutshell (unpublished paper Nov. 10, 1982); Rivett Letter, supra note 59.
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cases65 which involved a dispute between lode and placer66 claimants over
the same piece of ground. In the first case, Searle Placer, the Acting
Secretary of the Interior denied a placer claimant's application for patent
because he did not prove discovery-the presence of valuable placer
mineral in the claim "in any appreciable quantity." 67 In the subsequent
Clippercases before the Department, 6 the lode claimants argued that the
denial of patent for lack of discovery also invalidated the underlying placer
claim for lack of discovery. The Interior Department held, however, that
its decision in Searle Placer did not automatically void the placer claim.
Rather, the placer claimant retained his right to possession until the
Department declared the placer claim void.
The United States Supreme Court commented upon the Interior
Department's Clipperholdings in the related case of ClipperMining Co.
v. Eli Mining andLand Co. 9 In that case, the Court stated: "Undoubted-

ly when the department rejected the application for a patent [in Searle
Placerlit could have gone further and set aside the placer location.., and
restore[d] the land to the public domain."70 The Supreme Court thus
seemed to acquiesce to the two levels of discovery although it recognized
that the double standard was not required.
The Solicitor relied, in his Carlile opinion, on the later case of Union
Oil Co. v. Smith,71 in which the Supreme Court discussed the process by
which a person acquires a claim and then a patent. The process which the
Court set out in that case clearly makes discovery an issue of initial claim
location, not patenting. The Court did not suggest in Union Oil that a
claimant making a discovery sufficient for location may yet have to prove
discovery to a greater extent when applying for a patent.
It is clear from the Mining Law that the Solicitor's Carlile opinion
was correct. The statute provides that one who locates a valid claim
receives from the government the exclusive right to possession and enjoyment of the mineral deposit. 7 He has a possessory right in the prop-

erty as against all other persons, including the United States.73 He can,
as the Supreme Court noted in Union Oil Co. v. Smith, extract the minerals
until exhausted, with no payment of royalty. He need never obtain a

65. Searle Placer, 11 L.D. 441 (1890); Clipper Mining Co., 22 L.D. 527 (1896); Clipper
Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220 (1904); Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining
& Land Co., 33 L.D. 660 (1905).
66. A lode claim is one which is "predicated upon 'veins or lodes of quartz or other
rock in place'." Hill, PlacerMining Claims-Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 23
RoCKY MTN. MIN. LAW INST. 385, 392-93 (1977). A placer claim is one in which the mineral
is not found in a vein but in "'ground within defined boundaries which contains mineral
in its earth, sand or gravel; ground that includes valuable deposits not in place ....... "Id.
at 393 n.43, quoting United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673, 679 (1888).
67. Searle Placer, 11 L.D. 441, 442 (1890).
68. Clipper Mining Co., 22 L.D. 527 11896); Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land
Co., 33 L.D. 660 (1905).
69. 194 U.S. 220 (1904). This case involved a trespass action brought by the placer locator
against the lode claimant.
70. Id. at 223.
71. 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
72. 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
73. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1919).
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patent. A patent confers no greater right to mine than does the location
of a valid claim.
Persons wishing to obtain a patent for their claims are not required
to prove discovery by a different standard than that used for location.
The Mining Law makes plain that a grant of a patent is based upon
discovery made at location. Unless there is a challenge, a patent should
issue upon a showing of compliance with the requirements of location, the
performance of a certain amount of labor to improve the claim, and the
payment of a nominal sum per acre.7 Further, if there is a challenge to
a patent application for lack of discovery, the question to be resolved is
simply whether the patent applicant had made a valid location."
Long before Carlile and Union Oil, the Mining Law was read to contain a single discovery standard. Ironically, in 1895, as the two-standard
rule of the Clippercases was developing, the Acting Secretary of the Interior repudiated the suggestion that there could be two discovery
standards 4 "There must be a discovery before location. But after
discovery and location a subsequent compliance with the provisions of
section 2325"' of the Revised Statutes entitles the explorer to patent, and
no showing beyond his first discovery is required by the mining laws or
the regulations or decisions of this Department."7
Despite all the assertions that a lesser standard of discovery could
validate a claim for purposes of possession, none of the Clippercases contained a definition of the scope of this "lower" level of discovery. Nor has
any proponent of this system explained the factors in the Clipper cases
that marked the different discovery requirements.
Whether one seeks to establish a valid location or to obtain a patent,
he must establish discovery of a valuable mineral deposit. Although there
may be policy reasons to employ a lesser discovery standard for location
than the discovery standard employed for patents, it is clear from the Mining Law that there can be only one standard. Describing the scope of this
single standard is our next consideration.
DEVELOPMENT OF RULES OF DISCOVERY

The Prudent Man and Marketability Rules
It is a good thing that there is not a different level of discovery required for patenting than there is for claim location. It is a formidable
task simply to determine the one standard that is applied.
The discovery standard is difficult to understand primarily because
it has been set out in two different statements. First, there is the "prudent man test":
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

30 U.S.C. § 29 (1976).
30 U.S.C. § 30 (1976).
Tam v. Story, 21 L.D. 440 (1895).
Mining Law of 1872, § 6, 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1976).
Tam v. Story, 21 L.D. at 443 (citations omitted).
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[Wihere minerals have been found and the evidence is of such
a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified
in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine, the
requirements of the [Mining Law] have been met."9
Second, there is the "marketability test." This test, once an additional
requirement" when discovery of certain minerals was at issue, is now applied to all minerals and is often called a "refinement" 8' of the prudent
man rule. The marketability test requires a claimant to show that the
minerals found on his claim "can be extracted, removed, and marketed
at a profit.."8
The tests are very much alike in some ways. Both are economic tests
in which the value of the mineral deposit is weighed against costs
associated with a mining operation. To meet the prudent man test, a claimant must show that the expenditure of "labor and means" is justified
by the prospect of a profitable mine. 3 Under the marketability test the
claimant must show profitability, which is a return in excess of costs.84
Both tests are to be applied objectively. There can be a discovery under
the prudent man test only if the archetypical "person of ordinary
prudence" would conclude that the mine's development is worthwhile.85
As for the marketability test, its comparison of selling price and costs
to determine profitability is certainly objective.
Both tests must be satisfied on the basis of present knowledge of a
claim's contents. Under both tests a mineral deposit must actually have
been found. Geologic implications or other indications giving rise to the
hope that minerals exist on a claim are of no avail if no mineral is yet
exposed.8 6
Proof of the economic value of a deposit must be based upon present
facts. The use that can be made of economic facts, however, marks one
of the distinctions between the prudent man and marketability tests.
Under the prudent man test, the prospect of a profitable mine must be
based on current information.8" A reasonable prospect of success cannot
79. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
80. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
81. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1968); United States v. Noyce, 59
IBLA 268, 273 (1982).
82. United States v. Noyce, 59 IBLA 268, 273 (1982). Another statement of the test
is that the mineral must be capable of being "presently marketed at a profit." United States
v. Ledford, 49 IBLA 353 (1980); United States v. Baker, 23 IBLA 319 (1976). The IBLA
has also used the phrase "presently extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit." See, e.g.,
United States v. Duval, 53 IBLA 341 (1981).
83. Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920); Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
84. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1968).
85. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. at 456-57.
86. United States v. Bechtold, 25 IBLA 77, 89-90 (1976); Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D.
at 457.
87. United States v. Colonna and Co. of Colorado, 14 IBLA 220, 227 (1974); United
States v. Estate of Denison, 76 I.D. 233, 240 (1969).
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be founded upon speculation about future market prices or upon the hope
that technological advances may reduce costs. It is legitimate, however,
in prudent man analysis to consider the future as predictable from present facts.88 For example, the price of a mineral on a given day may be low
in relation to the cost of mining it. Judging from that price alone, a prudent man would not think of developing a mine. Other facts may show,
however, that the market for the metal is a fluctuating one which is likely to improve. If a prudent man can expect a profit "based upon rationally predictable economic circumstances from present known facts and not
upon mere speculation of possible substantial, unpredictable changes in
the market place," then the test is satisfied. 9
The marketability test is stated solely in terms of present facts.
"[Piresentmarkets, present demand, present price, and present costs" bind
the claimant.90 Unlike the prudent man test, which speaks of prospects,
the marketability test requires that the mineral can, at present, be
developed at a profit. In order to show that a deposit can be mined, removed, and sold at a profit, the claimant must produce evidence with a
high degree of certainty. He must have a very extensive knowledge of
the mineral deposit and of the economics of development.
The prudent man test, as we have seen, is stated in terms of a
"reasonable prospect of success" which suggests no more than a possibility-albeit a strong one-that a profitable mine may result. Satisfaction of this requirement does not demand as complete a picture of the
deposit as does the marketability test. It would seem that application of
the two tests might lead to different conclusions about the validity of a
claim. A claim might appear to meet the prudent man test but not the
marketability test. Yet, those who apply the tests consider them to set
the same standard of proof. The marketability test is said to be a "logical
complement" of the prudent man test, and like the prudent man test, applicable to all minerals. 9'
A brief review of the origins and development of these tests will help
explain their paths of development and their later merger.
The Origin of the Prudent Man Test
In the early years of the Mining Law little attention was directed to
the quantity and quality of minerals necessary to support a discovery. 2
Then, in the 1894 case of Castle v. Womble, 3 the Department of the Interior devised the prudent man rule which required those seeking to
88. United States v. Colonna and Co. of Colorado, 14 IBLA 220, 227 (1974); United
States v. Beal, 23 IBLA 378, 398 (1976).
89. Colonna, 14 IBLA at 227.
90. Reeves. The Law of Discovery Since Coleman, 21 RocHy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 415,
427 (19761.
91. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968).
92. See, e.g., Book v. Justice Mining Co., 58 F. 106, 120 (C.C.D. Nev. 1893); Jupiter
Mining Co. v. Brodie Consol. Mining Co., 11 F. 666, 675 (C.C. Cal. 18811.
93. 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
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establish location to show more than the bare existence of minerals on
a claim. The rule emphasized the Mining Law's requirement that only
The Supreme Court approved the rule
valuable deposits can be claimed.
94
in 1905 in Chrisman v. Miller.
The Development of the Marketability Test
The prudent man test had the effect of increasing the difficulty of proving location. The marketability test is seen today as an additional test
of claim validation that makes location even more difficult. It was originally devised, however, to broaden the application of the mining laws to allow
the location of mineral varieties not previously locatable.
At one time mineral entry could not be made on sand and gravel
deposits." The Department of the Interior was concerned that people
would use the location of sand and gravel claims as a pretext to acquire
land for non-mining purposes. The Department reversed itself, however,
in the 1929 case of Layman v. Ellis, and held that mineral entry could
be made on land containing sand or gravel.9 6 This location was possible,
however, only if the gravel made the land more valuable for mining than
for any other purpose, and only if the gravel "[could] be extracted, removed
and marketed at a profit."97 The marketability rule was created to permit
sand and gravel location while preventing sham operators from improperly
acquiring possession of public lands.
Four years after the Layman decision, the Acting Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior issued an opinion letter entitled the "Taking
of Sand and Gravel from Public Lands for Federal Aid Highways"9 in
which he adopted the Layman rule as Department policy. The marketability requirements, which the Acting Solicitor explicitly set forth in his opinion letter, ensured that location of sand and gravel could only occur in
good faith. 99
In 1955, the Mining Law was amended to prohibit locations of common varieties unless a deposit of a common variety had some characteristic
giving it distinct and special value.10° Furthermore, the United States was
authorized to manage the surface resources, such as soil, timber, and
water, found on mining claims. Surface resources on claims located after
1955 could not be used by the locators for any purposes other than those
related to mining the claim. This amendment forced miners to locate claims
in good faith for their minerals, and not as subterfuges to acquire valuable
94. 197 U.S. 313, 322 (1905).
95. See Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310 (1910).

96. 52 L.D. 714 (1929) (an opinion much broader than its title would suggest).
97. Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714, 721 (1929).

98. 54 I.D. 294 (1933).
99. The locator, "to justify his possession, must show that by reason of accessibility,
bona fides in development, proximity to market, existence of present demand, and other factors, the deposit is of such value that it can be mined, removed and disposed of at a profit."
Id at 296.
100. Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 368 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
611-615 (1976)).
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surface resources. It thus obviated the original need for the marketability test. But the rule lived on as the test of discovery for those common
varieties of distinct and special value which could still be mined. It also
regarding the validity of pre-1955 claims
remained the test in contests
0
for common varieties. '
The marketability rule was reexamined by the Solicitor in 1962,1 2 and
the rule emerged from his analysis changed in scope and meaning. The
Solicitor analyzed the relationship between the prudent man and
marketability rules and found that the prudent man test gave effect to
the Mining Law's requirement that only "valuable mineral deposits" could
be located. The prudent man test could be met only by the discovery of
marketable minerals. Otherwise a prudent man would not develop a mine.
The marketability test was merely one aspect of the prudent man test
and applied to all minerals, not just those of widespread occurrence. The
Solicitor further explained that the marketability aspect of the prudent
man test, although applicable to all minerals, was to be applied with varying degrees of strictness, depending upon the mineral involved. Intrinsically valuable minerals, such as gold, always have a market, and thus
they are always held to satisfy the marketability test. For non-metallic
minerals of widespread occurrence, on 03
the other hand, locators must show
that a market for the mineral exists.
The Solicitor had begun his opinion with the declaration that there
was "no basis for making any change in the test which the Department
applies to mining claims in determining whether there has been a valid
discovery. "104 Yet, notable in his discussion of marketability is the absence
of the concept of marketability at a profit which was central to the location of sand and gravel deposits. It is clear from the Solicitor's discussion that he considered marketable to mean only that a mineral could be
sold. A prudent man would develop a mineral deposit only if he could sell
his product. It would be possible for miners of abundant minerals, such
as sand and gravel, to fail the prudent man test because they could not
find buyers for their minerals.
As a practical matter, the Solicitor's reformulation of the marketability
test caused few, if any, real changes. Intrinsically valuable minerals would
invariably be marketable according to the Solicitor's definition. Claims
for such minerals would be measured by the prudent man test after a pro
forma inquiry into marketability. For sand and gravel, marketability in
the narrower sense of present marketability would be applied as before.
Finally, for minerals between the two extremes, the existence of a market
would remain a relevant consideration in determining whether a prudent
man would be justified in developing a mine.
101. See, e.g., Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
102. Opinion of the Solicitor, Marketability Rule, 69 I.D. 145 (1962) [hereinafter
Marketability Opinion].
103. For common varieties, the market had to exist on the date of withdrawal. Id. at 146.
104. Marketability Opinion, supra note 102, at 145.
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The Two Tests Merge
In 1968, the propriety of the marketability rule came before the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Coleman.'05 The Court analyzed
both the Solicitor's 1962 opinion and the original marketability test. Not
surprisingly, the Court created a new marketability rule different than
the two rules that it analyzed.
Coleman involved the alleged discovery of a common variety building
stone before the 1955 withdrawal. The claimant contended that compliance
with the marketability test should not be required for such minerals. The
Court held that the marketability test was indeed applicable because it
was "an admirable effort to identify with greater precision and objectivirelevant to a determination that a mineral deposit is
ty the factors
'valuable'." 06 Furthermore, the test prevented claims from being validated
on behalf of those who really did not intend to mine.0 7
The Court rejected the argument that the marketability test was to
be applied only to minerals of widespread occurrence. Rather, the Court
thought it was "a logical complement to the 'prudent-man test' " which
was applied to all mineral locations.' The Court stated that:
While it is true that the marketability test is usually the critical
factor in cases involving non-metallic minerals of widespread occurence [sic], this is accounted for by the perfectly natural reason
that precious metals which are in small supply and for which there
is a great demand, sell at a price so high as to leave little room
for doubt that they can be extracted and marketed at a profit.'
The Court's marketability test departed from the original marketability test because the original test had only been applied in common variety locations. The Court's test also departed from the Solicitor's 1962 approach which had applied the marketability rule to all minerals, but which
had varied the burden of proof of marketability depending on the mineral
involved. In Coleman, the Court decided that a locator had to meet the
same standard-marketability at a profit-regardless of the mineral that
he was locating.
The Coleman decision thus stated a requirement for discovery that
was without precedent. This is not to say that the prudent man test does
not contemplate profit. As the Supreme Court stated in Coleman, a prudent man would not extract minerals if there is no demand for them at
a price higher than the cost of extraction." 0 As explained earlier, however,
105. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
106. Coleman, 390 U.S. at 602.
107. Id. at 603.
108. Id. at 602.
109. Id. at 603. This last statement was not part of the original marketability rule for
common varieties, or the Solicitor's 1961 opinion on marketability. The statement is not
even accurate as can be seen by the recent closings of precious metal mines due to low market
prices. See, Gulf Resources Decides to Close Idaho Mine, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1981, at 4,
col. 1 (relating decision to close Bunker Hill Mine at Kellogg, Idaho to low silver prices).
110. Coleman, 390 U.S. at 602.
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the traditional prudent man test permits discovery if there is a reasonable
prospect of a paying mine. If market prices of a mineral generally exceed
the costs of producing it, then a prudent man will mine despite a fall in
the market which temporarily prevents profits. But, as we have seen, even
such a conservative reliance on the future has no place in the marketability
rule. The marketability rule calls for a greater degree of certainty about
a deposit's value than does the traditional prudent man rule which only
requires "reasonable prospects." It is more than a refinement to require
that locators prove that their mineral can be marketed at a present profit.
The Coleman decision provoked considerable confusion among adjudicators, administrators, and claimants. It appeared that the Supreme
Court intended application of both the prudent man test and the presentmarketability-at-a-profit test to determine discovery in all cases notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the two tests.
After fifteen years and scores of Interior Department and court decisions, there is still uncertainty as to how to apply the Coleman rule of
discovery. One would think that the stricter marketability test would completely overwhelm the prudent man test and become the sole determinant
of discovery. Shortly after Coleman, in Converse v. Udall the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the application of the marketability test in all cases, as required by Coleman,
"significantly tightened" the test for discovery.' Yet, in Converse, the
court approved the analysis by a hearing examiner who "expressly followed the prudent man test [and] did not purport to follow the marketability
test.""'
The following statements regarding the Forest Service's position on
wilderness claim discovery further illustrate the uncertainty surrounding
the Coleman rule. A form letter sent by forest supervisors to wilderness
claim holders in 1983 stated: "To have your 'find' qualify as a discovery,
you must be able to show the Forest Service evidence ...that you have
found a locatable mineral deposit, and that it can be mined, removed, and
marketed at a profit."," The letter thus states the classic marketability
rule, but without its original limitation to common variety minerals.
A 1982 letter from the Chief of the Forest Service to Senator Malcolm
Wallop of Wyoming advised that wilderness mining claims valid on
December 31, 1983 may be operated after that date. A requirement of
111. Converse v. Udal, 399 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,393 U.S. 1025 (1969).
112. Id. at 622. The Converse court was clearly uncertain how to apply the Coleman
holding. The court stated:
We think [that for non-common varieties] it is still the law that there need not
be a full showing of marketability, such as the Secretary required in Coleman.
...[Tihe marketability test does permit the fact finder, even in the case of
...
gold, to consider somewhat more extensively than heretofore, the economics
of the situation.... But this does not mean that the locator must prove that
he will in fact develop a profitable mine.
The last statement, of course, ignores the marketability test's requirement that a claimant
show that he can market his product at a present profit.
113. See, e.g, Letter from Willaim Morden, Supervisor, Kootenai National Forest, to
Pacific Coast Mines (March 28, 1983).
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validity, the letter stated, included "discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit in accordance with the 'prudent man concept'." 1 4 The Chief's
reference to the prudent man rule does not indicate whether he meant the
traditional prudent man rule or the rule containing the "refinement" of
the marketability test.
In yet another communication, the Alaska Regional Forester wrote
his forest supervisors in April, 1983 that a valid discovery is determined
by the prudent man rule. He added that the Coleman decision requires
the marketability test as a refinement of the prudent man test. "The
reasoning behind this decision," he explained, "is that if a product cannot be marketed, it has no value, and the 'Prudent-Man Rule,' therefore
has not been met.""' 5 This statement that the material must be merely
marketable, not marketable at a profit, is reminiscent of the 1962 Solicitor's opinion.
The Interior Department, in virtually all of its decisions in claim contests, states that it applies the prudent man rule as refined by its "logical
complement," the marketability test, regardless of the mineral involved."'
The Department has also stated that the Supreme Court, in Coleman, "approved" or "refined" the prudent man test."7 It is also frequently stated
that the prudent man test implies a requirement that the miner show that
his mineral can be mined, removed, and marketed at a profit. 8
These formulas for discovery, recited over and over in the cases, do
not provide very useful guidelines for claimants intending to establish the
validity of their claims. The Department's analyses of evidence presented
in the many cases since Coleman must be examined to understand what
it actually requires as proof of discovery.
ELEMENTS OF DIscoVERY

The Mining Law requires discovery of "valuable mineral deposits."119
In order to show discovery, a claimant must present evidence of the existence of a mineral deposit and evidence of economic factors which will
prove the deposit valuable: the existence of a market, the costs of development, and the price that can be obtained for the mineral.
Proof of a Mineral Deposit
The first element of discovery that a claimant must prove is the
presence of minerals on his claim. No matter how favorable the geologic
indications or how strong the belief of the claimholder, there is no
114. Letter from R. Max Peterson, Chief, Forest Service, to Senator Malcolm Wallop
(June, 1982).
115. Letter from John A. Sandor, Regional Forester, Alaska Region, to Forest Supervisors (April 4, 1983).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 67 IBLA 225 (1982); United States v. Ramsey,
14 IBLA 152 (1974).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 53 IBLA 333 (1981).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 82 IBLA 344 (1984).
119. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
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discovery if there has been no exposure of minerals on the claim.2 0 If a
claimant has a number of claims, then each claim, to be valid, must be
shown to have minerals within it.121
The fact that minerals have once been exposed on a claim is not enough
to prove validity if they are no longer exposed. 12 2 If the claim is a
wilderness claim, then the claimant must prove exposure on both the date
of withdrawal (January 1, 1984) and the date of the hearing. 23 Exploration work to acquire evidence of mineralization cannot be done after the
date of withdrawal. 12 4 Samples may1 be
taken after withdrawal, however,
5
from minerals previously exposed.
Whether a claimant has actually found minerals is rarely an issue in
contests. More than mere presence of minerals, however, must be proved.
The claimant must prove a mineral deposit of sufficient quality and quantity to be valuable. 2 6 Samples "representative of the the mineral deposit"
provide evidence of the quality of the mineral. 12 But proving the quantity of a deposit is often a major obstacle which must be overcome before
the claimant can even address the quality issue.
It has been held that a claimant need not provide physical evidence
of the exact extent of his deposit.2 8 There must only be evidence of
mineralization to a "consistent extent," that is, marked by continuity. 1 9
The extent of the deposit can be estimated from geologic inference,
evidence of successful development of similar deposits or of adjacent
claims, and deductions from established fact.'3" A claimaint may introduce
evidence of geologic inferences, however, only when there is "sufficient
factual basis" to support such inferences; that is, when a deposit is
shown.' 3 1
What constitutes a sufficient factual basis to allow admission of
geologic inferences has not been altogether clear in the past. Recently,
in United States v. Feezor,'32 the IBLA recognized a "tension" that had
developed in the case law regarding the prerequisites to reliance upon
geologic inferences.
In Feezor, the IBLA identified its earlier decision of United States
v. Edeline'" as a source of confusion of the issue. In Edeline, the exposure
120. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455 (1894).
121. Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 1963).
122. United States v. Mortenson, 7 IBLA 123 (1972).
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
124. United States v. Chappell, 42 IBLA 74 (1979).
125. United States v. Gunsight Mining Co., 5 IBLA 62 (1972).
126. Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1976), affd sub. nom., Thomas
v. Andrus, 552 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edeline, 39 IBLA 236 (1979).
127. United States v. Bechtel, 25 IBLA 77, 88 (1976).
128. United States v. Hooker, 48 IBLA 22, 30 (1980).
129. Barton v. Morton, 498 F.2d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1974).
130. United States v. Hooker, 48 IBLA 22 GFS(MIN) 126 (1980).
131. United States v. Edeline, 39 IBLA 236 (1979).
132. 90 I.D. 262, 74 IBLA 56 (1983).
133. 39 IBLA 236 J1979).
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of spotty and discontinuous mineralization was held insufficient to prove
a valuable mineral deposit. The IBLA held that geologic inference "cannot be used as a substitute for evidence sufficiently showing the existence
of an ore body or bodies necessary to warrant a prudent man to develop
a valuable mine. " 134 This holding meant, in effect, that geologic inferences
would be permitted only when they were unnecessary.
In Feezor, the IBLA rejected the Edeline rule and pointed out that,
in fact, it had not been followed in later cases. A key distinction between
Edeline and the other decisions, the IBLA explained, was in the use of
the terms "mineral deposit" and "valuable mineral deposit." A mineral
deposit meant, in the context of a lode claim, "that a mineralized area
in a vein or lode [had] been disclosed. It [did] not necessarily mean that
a valuable mineral deposit [had] been exposed." 3 ' A valuable mineral
deposit, on the other hand, was a "mineral deposit of sufficient quantity
and quality so as to justify a prudent man in expending both labor and
money in developing a paying mine."13 6 The case law established, the
Feezor Board stated, that exposure of a mineral deposit was a sufficient
precondition to the use of geologic inference. There had been cases, since
Edeline, in which the IBLA seemed to suggest that there must be exposure
of a mineral deposit to a certain extent-even to the extent that the exposed minerals themselves qualified as valuable-before geologic inferences could be used in evidence. The IBLA concluded in Feezor,
however, that the Board had permitted geologic inferences in those cases
but those inferences had been insufficient to establish the deposits as
valuable.
As a matter of law, exposure of minerals permits the use of geologic
inferences as evidence, but as a matter of fact, such evidence can be insufficient to establish the extent of a deposit. Geologic inference is most
helpful to claimants when values are high and relatively consistent because
it can be readily inferred that a sufficient quantity of mineralization exists beyond that already exposed. The Board erred in Edeline by holding
that geologic inference was inadmissible even though minerals were exposed on the claim. As in other cases involving claims with isolated but
high quality mineralization, geologic inferences should have been admitted even though they could not, in the end, establish that a valuable
mineral deposit existed.
The IBLA pointed out in Feezor that geologic inference may not be
used when minerals of only low value have been exposed. Low value
mineralization is not considered a deposit. A claimant who can only show
low mineralization does not give a sufficient factual basis for the use of
geologic inference. The Feezor Board cited Henault v. Tysk, 3' to illustrate
this point. In Henault, the mineralization found on the claim was low grade
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 241.
United States v. Feezor, 90 I.D. 262, 273, 74 IBLA 56, 75 (1983).
Id. at 272-73, 74 IBLA at 75.
419 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
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gold ore occurring in formations known as dikes.'3" Rich gold deposits had
been found on both sides of the claim under the same type of dikes. It
seemed logical to conclude that a valuable deposit also lay under the dikes
within the contested claim. Because only low grades of gold had been exposed, however, the Board refused to allow geologic
inference to establish
39
existence of a high grade, or valuable, deposit.'
It is clear from the IBLA decisions that a valuable mineral deposit
will be recognized only if enough is known, or can be inferred, about the
physical make-up of a claim to justify a decision to mine."40 If further exploration is necessary before such a decision can be made, then a valuable
mineral deposit has not been discovered.' A claimant who is justified
only in further investigation is a "prudent prospector," not a prudent
miner.14 The United States will not part with possession of land "merely
because a mining claimant has found enough evidence of mineralization
to stimulate his desire to take a blind risk in the unjustified hope that
fate will be kind," the IBLA explained in United States v.GunsightMining Co., a 1972 decision."13 "A risk which relies upon chance to a disproportionate degree cannot be regarded as an endeavor in which a prudent man
would be justified in investing with a reasonable expectation of success."I"
The Interior Department cannot judge whether a prudent man would
be justified in investing his money and labor in a deposit simply from
evidence of the extent and grade of the deposit. In order for a mineral
deposit to be located, it must also be valuable. The claimant must prove
that it is economically feasible to develop his mine and economic feasibility
depends upon the existence of a market for the mineral, the cost of extraction, and the price that can be obtained for the mineral.
Existence of a Market
A claimant must present evidence of a "present and continuing demand" for his product. 1 5 When there has been a withdrawal he must show
that the demand existed at the time of the withdrawal, as well as the time
of the contest. 146 A showing that the claimant is exploring possible future
markets and uses for his mineral is insufficient."7 Also insufficient is a
showing that a mineral, unmarketable at present, would be marketable
138. A dike is "a long mass of igneous rock that cuts across the structure of adjacent
rock." AMERICAN

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

369 (1978).

139. Henault v. Tysk, 419 F.2d at 766; see also Barton v. Morton, 498 F.2d 288 (9th
Cir. 1974).
140. See United States v. Blue Bell Gold Mining Co., 17 IBLA 182 (1974); United States
v. Woolsey, 13 IBLA 120 (1973).
141. See United States v. Tappan, 25 IBLA 1, 18 (1976); United States v. Ramsey, 14
IBLA 152, 156 (1974).
142. Henault Mining Co. v,Tysk, 419 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1970).
143. United States v. Gunsight Mining Co., 5 IBLA 62, 69 (1972).
144. Id.
145. United States v. Rouse, 56 IBLA 36 (1981).
146. See United States v. Duval, 53 IBLA 341 (1981).
147. Rouse, 56 IBLA at 39.
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in event of a war, the cut-off of cheap imported supplies, or some other
contingency." 8
For some minerals, a claimant need not specifically show that they
can be sold. As noted by the IBLA in United States v. Larsen, minerals
whose supply has never exceeded demand can always be marketed.' 19 One
cannot assume the existence of ready buyers, however, when a mineral
is abundant. The claimant must therefore show that "by virtue of the
quality of the material found on his claim, its proximity to a market, or
some equally cogent factor, he will be able to capture a share of the market
for that mineral.'5 If the mineral cannot be sold, it is not valuable.,'
Minerals are often sold in captive markets. Such markets exist when
a claim's product will be sold only if a contract can be made with a specific
buyer. If there are only a few buyers requiring a limited amount of a
mineral, then a claimant must present evidence that he can capture a part
that specific buyers are interested
of the market. He must present evidence
15
in the purchase of his product. 1
For minerals of widespread occurrence, it is generally necessary to
show that the mineral can be produced and sold at a profit in the present
market in competition with existing suppliers."' The mineral must be extracted and transported at a cost which will provide a profit "comparable
to that which attaches to the material being successfully marketed by
others.""' Further, it must be shown that local demand can absorb the
increased supply from the claimant's proposed production "and still permit an attractive profit to be realized.""' This showing is made by comparing the total demand against the total supply. Total supply includes
the claimant's supply and "all other known potentially competitive
sources.""' If total supply "amounts to a superabundance and so overwhelms the existing demand as to reduce the value or profit increment
to a level below that which would prove attractive to a prudent man, the
material cannot be said to be marketable at a profit.""' 7 When there is
an abundance in supply the IBLA has declared that the claimant may
need to show a superior quality product, lower production costs, or like
advantages which would attract buyers to his product."'
In some instances, a claimant's mineral supply alone creates superabundance. There may be so much ore on a group of claims that all of
148. United States v. Jenkins, 75 I.D. 312 (1968). This case involved manganese, domestic
stocks of which had never been sold except in wartime or because of some government stockpiling which was completed by the time of this case.
149. United States v. Larsen, 9 IBLA 247, 254 (19731.
150. Id. at 255.
151. Williamson v. Lapine Pumice Co., 87 I.D. 34, 50, 45 IBLA 264, 294 (1980).
152. United States v. Duval, 53 IBLA 341 (1981); Rodgers v. Watt, 726 F.2d 1376 (9th
Cir. 1984).
153. Melluzzo v. Morton, 534 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1976).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id.
158. United States v. The Dredge Corp., 54 IBLA 281 (1981).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss1/2

22

Toffenetti: Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas

1985

VALID MINING RIGHTS AND WILDERNESS AREAS

it cannot possibly be sold. In judging the validity of such claims, the
Department considers how many of the claims are required to supply the
for the product. 5 9 Only that number of
market reasonably anticipated
160
valid.
claims can be held
The reasonably anticipated supply includes a reasonable reserve which
can be held without being mined at present."' The voided claims are said
to hold "excess reserves."16 2 In a contest brought upon application for
patents for perlite claims, the IBLA explained its reason for voiding claims
of excess reserves:
It is difficult to see how the purposes of the mining laws would
be accomplished by patenting all the mining claims, and thus
depriving the United States and the public of any other use of the
land, when there is no reasonable probability or even possibility
that more than a fraction of the deposits could be exploited within
the reasonably forseeable future, even making allowance for the
reserves necessary to sustain a mining operation. Justification exists only for holding valid those claims which would supply contestees with the deposits necessary to carry on an operation of
the size they contemplate for a reasonable period of time, for in
only those deposits have a reasonable prosa hard economic sense
63
pect of a market.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed
with the policy of voiding claims of excess reserves in the 1980 case of
Baker v. United States. In that case, the IBLA had invalidated two of
claimant Baker's four cinder claims16 even though each claim considered
in isolation would have been valid. The total volume of Baker's claims
would have given him a 270 to 400 year supply. The IBLA held that if
this amount were added to the market, then the supply of cinders would
far exceed the reasonably anticipated demand. By voiding two of the four
claims, the IBLA left Baker with a 100 to 200 year supply.
On appeal, the court held that the "too much" rule, as it termed invalidation of claims with excess reseves, had no basis in the Mining Law.
"The validity of a claim has always been determined by an inquiry into
that particular claim, not by an examination of the individual's other
claims," the court stated.'" "[Congress] has never attempted to either limit
the amount of mineral, or the overall number of claims, which can be
patented by an individual."' 67 Further, the court stated that the "too
159. United States v. Bunkowski, 79 I.D. 43, 5 IBLA 102 (1972).
160. Id
161. See United States v. Oneida Perlite Corp., 88 I.D. 772, 780, 57 IBLA 167, 182 (1981).
162. Id at 781, 57 IBLA at 183-84; United States v. Anderson, SO-1968-1 (Mining).
163. United States v. Anderson, SO-1968-1, 12 (Mining).
164. 613 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub. nom. Andrus v. Baker, 449 U.S. 932
(1980) (3 justices dissenting).
165. United States v. Baker, 23 IBLA 319 (1976).
166. Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d at 229.
167. Id
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much" rule was "a wholly unreliable subjective
analysis, resting too much
1 68
in the eye of the administrative beholder."'
The IBLA has continued to void claims with excess reserves despite
the Baker decision. In a 1981 case, United States v. Oneida Perlite, the
Board invalidated 1,280 acres of a contestee's 1,860 acre perlite deposit
because the 1,280 acres held "excess reserves. ' 69 The IBLA explained
that it could lawfully void an excess supply of a mineral without exceeding
its power:
[A] reference to "excess reserves" does not describe a new rule
of law invented by this Department.... It is nothing more or less
than a descriptive phrase ... [which] describes the location of
claims for far more land and mineral than reason and prudence
would allow because there is such a superabundance of the material
that the market simply cannot accept all of it at a profit. Therefore,
some of the deposits must be regarded as not valuable in an
economic sense.... This concern for excess reserves is rooted in
the basic statute, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976), and controlled by the "prudent man" test of discovery as complemented by the requirement
that the economic value of the deposit be measured by a deter17 0
mination of whether it is presently marketable at a profit.
While one could say that the claims in Oneida Perlite held "excess reserves," it could equally be said that there had been no discovery of a
valuable mineral deposit, a matter, the IBLA made clear, that it was
perfectly competent to judge. 7'
The IBLA also made clear in Oneida Perlite that the amount of
material involved, not the fact that only one party claimed it, required
invalidation of some of the claims. It would make no difference whether
one person held fifty claims or fifty persons each held one claim. Had
others claimed the voided acres in OneidaPerlite,those claims would still
have been invalid because the supply of the mineral entering the market
would have exceeded the demand, rendering the operation of additional
claims unprofitable.'72
The invalidation of claims because of "excess reserves" is consistent
with the principle that a deposit cannot be valuable if it cannot be
marketed. Value is a relative term, and as the IBLA recognizes, a commodity's value depends, in part, upon its scarcity. Notwithstanding the
circuit court's disapproval, the Oneida Perlitedecision is a warning that
the "excess reserves" rule will continue to figure into the Interior Department's value analysis.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Oneida Perlite Corp., 88 I.D. 772, 57 IBLA 167 (1981).
170. Id. at 787-88, 57 IBLA at 195.
171. Id.
172. For additional discussion of the "excess reserves" controversy involving the IBLA
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981). See also BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 83-124 (1982).
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Costs
The potential costs of mining a claim are important in determining
the value of the mineral deposit. Realistic appraisal of a claim is not possible if costs are ignored.'" If the quantity of a recoverable mineral is small
or disputed, then the costs of extraction can be crucial to a determination of the claim's value."'
The costs to consider include all those that are likely to be incurred
in developing a claim and they depend on the type of mining operation
anticipated. " 5 Costs must be considered objectively, without regard to
any special cost-limiting factors particular to the claim being analyzed.176
For example, the amortized cost of equipment already owned by a claimant must be added to the cost estimate even though he will not have to
buy that equipment again.1" Moreover, equipment must be valued on an
objective basis even if the particular claimant can purchase or lease it
below the going rate.7 "
Transportation costs must also be considered. Loading and transportation of ore can be major expenses of an operation,'79 as can the construction or rehabilitation of access roads and acquisition of easements over
private land.8 0
The cost of water and water rights must be considered for some
operations. 8 ' And in these times of high interest rates, the cost of financing is significant. 8 '
The expense of environmental protection must be figured into the
analysis. "To the extent federal, state, or local law requires that antipollution devices or other environmental safeguards be installed and maintained as part of [a mining operation]," the cost of these measures may
be taken into account. 1 3 Costs incurred because of compliance with restrictions on mining activity in special areas must be included.' They should
prove to be important in cost estimates for wilderness operations.
Claimants generally accept the fact that costs should be included in
the determination of a claim's value. They often fail, however, to make
estimates of the cost of their mining operations, or they fail to include
certain costs. An operator's own wages are a frequently overlooked expense. In a small operation, where the owner is also the labor force,
173. United States v. McKenzie, 4 IBLA 97, 109 (1971).
174. United States v. Harris, 38 IBLA 137, 140 (1978).
175. United States v. Bechthold, 25 IBLA 77, 87 (1976).
176. United States v. Garner, 30 IBLA 42, 67 (1977).
177. Id.
178. Id
179. United States v. Marion, 37 IBLA 68, 78 (1978).
180. United States v. Rouse, 56 IBLA 36 (1981).
181. United States v. Pittsburgh Pacific Co., 84 I.D. 282, 285, 30 IBLA 388, 394 (1977).
182. Id. at 288, 30 IBLA at 399.
183. United States v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 80 I.D. 538, 546, 12 IBLA 282, 299 (1973).
184. United States v. Rouse, 56 IBLA 36, 39 (1981). This case involved National Park
Service restrictions. The claimant was trying to prove the claim was valid before the land
was included in the National Park System and withdrawn from mining.
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reasonable wages for the operator and his help must be allocated to costs.
The IBLA has held that the value of a claimant's labor equals the value
of hired labor.'85 This is so even if the claimant is willing to work for far
less than miner's wages. Sometimes a mine provides only a small suppleregular income. Claimants may consider such lifestyles
ment to a miner's
'
"prudent."186
The government, however, requires that a mine be capable
of paying reasonable wages for the laborers needed to work it. Miner's
costs,
wages for all who work on a claim must therefore be allocated to 87
even if some of the workers are friends lending gratuitous help.1
Price
The price for which a claim's minerals can be sold is an important factor in determining the claim's validity. Despite the marketability test's
emphasis on the present, the Interior Department does not base its price
estimate entirely on present market prices. For example, the Department
does not require evidence of the market price on the exact date of
withdrawal. Rather, the IBLA has referred in its opinions to average
prices, over a period of time. 8 The IBLA recognizes that mineral prices
often fluctuate and has held that "[njormal economic fluctuation is a factor which a prudent man would consider in determining whether he would
invest in the development of a given mineral property."'18 9
In In re Pacific Coast Molybdenum Co.,'8 0 the IBLA provided a wellstated guideline for acceptable evidence of price. The IBLA acknowledged
that use of a mineral's price on a specific date could give a very unrealistic
picture of a claim's value. The price on a given day could be atypically
high or low. A truer picture of value is shown by the "relevant historic
range" of prices the mineral has commanded on the market. 19'
By "relevant historic range" the IBLA means the historic price range
under market conditions similar to those existing at the time of claim adjudication. If there has been a "major structural alteration in the market"
or if there have been "technological breakthroughs" that render "irrelevant past economic experience," then reliance on the historic range of
prices is improper."8 2
The manganese industry provides an example of changed circumstances which rendered the "historic range" irrelevant. Until 1959,
the federal government stockpiled domestically produced manganese as
a strategic mineral. Upon termination of this program the price of
domestically produced maganese ore dropped from ninety dollars per ton
185. United States v. Kiggins, 39 IBLA 88, 90 (1979) (Burski, J., concurring); United
States v. Gardener, 18 IBLA 175, 179 (1975).
186. Gardener,18 IBLA at 179.
187. United States v. Stocker, 10 IBLA 158 (1973).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker, 48 IBLA 22 (1980).
189. United States v. Hines Gilbert Gold Mines Co., GFS-BLA-MIN-1971-2.
190. 90 I.D. 352, 75 IBLA 16 (1983).
191. Id at 360, 75 IBLA at 29.
192. Id.
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to about forty dollars per ton. The historic price of ninety dollars per ton
thus became irrelevant to a determination of market price for claim
adjudication.' 93
Frequently the IBLA will take judicial notice of price rises. In United
States v. Kinsley Ranch Resort the Board noted that the price of gold,
the mineral in issue, increased by five times while the appeal was
pending.194 The Board remanded the case to the administrative law judge
for reconsideration of the discovery in light of the increased price.' 95 It
should be pointed out, however, that no withdrawal of the claim site from
operation of the Mining Law was involved in Kinsley, so the price on a
prior withdrawal date did not control the validity of the claim. If
withdrawal had been involved, then the Board would not have considered
the price increase that occurred after the date of withdrawal. At the time
of withdrawal, the price increase would have been purely speculative.' 96
Proving a Valuable Mineral Deposit
A claimant attempting to locate a claim has the burden of establishing
all of the elements discussed above. As we have seen, each element must
be established with solid evidence. Typically, claims are held invalid
197
because evidence on one or more of the elements is clearly insufficient.
The hearing examiner must rarely consider whether the combination of
elements proves a valid claim.
Occasionally, claimants do support each element of discovery with sufficient evidence so that the hearing examiner can proceed to judge whether
the evidence as a whole proves the existence of a valuable mineral deposit.
The hearing examiner must employ both the prudent man test and the
present marketability test in his analysis. The Interior Department has
fashioned a fairly workable analytical rule which it considers consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Coleman.
A review of the cases shows that the Department has retained the
flexible "reasonable prospect" language of the prudent man rule even
though the Supreme Court seemed to require in Coleman that the Department employ the more rigid marketability language. In 1969, shortly after
the Coleman and Converse decisions, the Interior Department Solicitor
justified the Department's position by stating that:
The whole question is one of semantics. In speaking of a "reasonable prospect of success in developing a valuable mine," the prudent man rule necessarily invokes a time concept . . . [WIhile
193. United States v. Denison, 71 I.D. 144 (19641, rev'd and remanded sub nom., Denison
v. Udall 248 F. Supp. 942 (D. Ariz. 1964), reaff'd on remand, United States v. Estate of Denision, 76 I.D. 233 (1969).
194. 20 IBLA 14 (1975).
195. See also United States v. Heard, 18 IBLA 43 (1974).
196. United States v. Gold Placers, 25 IBLA 368, 374 (1976).
197. Often the failure of evidence is in the lack of documentation to support a claimant's
assertions, particularly about mineral grade, or production costs. See, e.g., United States
v. Arbo, 70 IBLA 244 (1983).
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reasonable prospect of success contains a connotation which has
room for the future, it does not embrace a vague distant future." 8
According to the Solicitor, the phrases "present marketability" and "a
reasonable prospect of a future market" "[do] not express mutually exclusive concepts. The critical determination is whether, based on present
facts, there is a reasonable prospect of success.''199
The Department's test, despite the Solicitor's rationalization, is purely
a "prudent man" analysis. Even if the hearing officer is limited to present facts, he is employing the prudent man test if those present facts indicate "prospects" of success. Ever since the prudent man test was first
expressed in Castle v. Womble,200 hearing examiners have been required
to base their judgments of the "prospects" of claims upon present facts.
As we have seen, the strict marketability test does not permit consideration of "prospects." In order to hold a claim valid the examiner must find
that the mineral can, at present, be developed at a profit.
In the first case in which the newly formed IBLA addressed the issue
of discovery, UnitedStates v. Siluerton Mining and Milling Co., the Board
favored the prudent man prescription:
In determining whether a mineral deposit is valuable the Secretary may require a showing that there is a reasonable expectation based upon the circumstances known at the time that the
mineral can be extracted, removed, and marketed at a profitthat is that it is marketable at a profit. It need not be proved that
1
the claim can in fact be operated at a profit ....
Although the Board employed language from the marketability test ("that
the mineral can be extracted, removed and marketed at a profit"), the
Board qualified it with phrases from the prudent man test. The Board
did not require the claimant in Silverton to show that his product could
be marketed at a profit, but it simply required a showing that there be
a reasonable prospect of a profitable mine. The IBLA thus bent the
marketability test's strict grounding in the "present," and its requirement
of certainty, in order to fit the marketability test within the prudent man
rule.
In re Pacific Coast Molybdenum Co.,202 contains the IBLA's latest
discussion of the test for discovery and provides an important guide to
the Board's interpretation of the present marketability requirement. The
IBLA rejected the idea that an inquiry into present marketability tied
a mineral to a particular price or to particular costs on a particular day.
Many minerals such as molybdenum, the mineral in issue, "show marked
price elasticity for both demand and supply fluctuations."' 20 3 The IBLA
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

United States v. Estate of Denison, 76 I.D. 233 (1969).
Id.
19 L.D. 455 (1894).
United States v. Silverton Mining & Milling Co., GFS-BLA-MIN-1970-1.
90 I.D. 352, 75 IBLA 16 (1983).
Id.
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explained that determining marketability from solely present conditions
may create a very unrealistic picture of the long term market. This would
be the case, according to the IBLA, unless the term "present" were given
a broad interpretation:
"Present marketability" had never encompassed the examination of either cost or price factors as of a specific, finite moment
of time, without reference to other economic factors. Rather the
question of whether something is "presently marketable at a profit" simply means that a mining claimant must show that, as a
present fact, considering historic price and cost factors and assuming that they will continue, there is a reasonable likelihood of success ....204
The "present marketability" language of the marketability rule is here
given such a broad interpretation that the original 1894 statement of the
prudent man rule adequately describes the requirement for discovery.
Evidence grounded in present facts justifies a prudent man in further expending money and labor, and present facts are those facts that are relevant to a decision to develop a mine.
This approach certainly makes good sense. Success or failure of a long
term venture like mining is manifested over time. And of course, there
can never be a complete guarantee of success. Though the words of the
marketability test suggest otherwise, the IBLA has often disclaimed any
requirement that a claimant prove that his mine is a sure money-maker." 5
The relevant historic range of prices and costs is probably the most
realistic gauge by which to judge a claim's potential.
Perhaps it can be said that the marketability rule, as interpreted by
the IBLA and the courts since Coleman, is a "logical complement" and
"refinement" of the prudent man rule. It could also be said, however, that
it is simply an unnecessary complication. Decisions since Coleman can
be justified on the basis of the prudent man rule without the additional
statement that one must prove that the mineral "can be extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit." 08
The Interior Department has not specified the level of profitability
necessary to prove a "valuable mineral deposit." In United States v.
Oxford,"°7 the IBLA rejected the proposition that the expected return from
a mining operation must compare with the rate of return obtainable from
investments in labor, government bond, or other markets. Claims upon
which one would undertake an "apparently marginal enterprise" were held
for the Ninth Circuit in
valid by the United States Court of Appeals
20 8
Charleston Stone Products v. Andrus.
204. Id. at 360, 75 IBLA at 29.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Mannix, 50 IBLA 110 (1980).
206. See supra text accompanying note 82.
207. United States v. Oxford, 4 IBLA 236 (1972).
208. 553 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 436 U.S. 604 (1977).
The IBLA had held most of these claims invalid. 9 IBLA 94 (1973).
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If a small operation promises to be marginal, the IBLA may have to
decide whether an owner-operator's wages should be considered as profits. Wages are properly assessed as costs in the discovery analysis, but
they may also be the major part of an operator's return on his mine. If
an owner's wages are called profits, then a claim which promises to support only a marginal operation may pass the prudent man test. The IBLA
suggested in United States v. Wells that owner-operators who pay themselves the usual miner's wage can make their venture "profitable" even
though the operation as a whole loses money.20 9 In United States v. Kiggins, however, it was suggested that if an operation promises to merely
break even after wages are disbursed, then the operation cannot be held
profitable."0 In a special concurrence, a member of the IBLA panel expressed concern about undervaluing the significance of the owneroperator's wage. The IBLA has not reviewed enough cases on this issue
to establish a firm rule. From the objective viewpoint used in discovery
analysis, it would seem that if a small operation can provide its owner
with a comfortable living, then he would be prudent to engage in it.
Summary
In order to perfect a mineral claim on public lands under the Mining
Law, one must monument it, record it in the county courthouse, file a
notice of it with the BLM, and prove discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit. Satisfyring the discovery requirement is the most difficult of these
steps.
A claimant must produce evidence of four elements in order for the
Interior Department to determine that a discovery has been made. Initially, he must prove that a mineral deposit is actually on the claim.
Minerals must be exposed, and the evidence must indicate mineralization
to a consistent extent. Having established the presence of a deposit on
his claim, the claimant must then produce evidence of the other factors
which will prove the deposit valuable. He must show that there is a market
for the mineral. For some minerals a market is understood to exist, and
no specific showing is necessary. If the mineral in issue is abundant, or
the market small, then proof of a market can be crucial. Also, the claimant must account for all costs that he will incur in his prospective mining
operation. Finally, the claimant must present evidence of the price that
can be obtained for the mineral. Because prices can fluctuate greatly, the
Interior Department permits reliance upon a relevant historic range of
prices.
The discovery determination depends on the relationship between
these elements. Two tests of discovery have been formulated by the Interior Department and the courts. The first, the prudent man test,
recognizes a discovery if minerals have been found and the evidence is
209.
210.
question
pled, the

11 IBLA 253, 261 (1973).
United States v. Kiggins, 39 IBLA 88 (1979). The claim in this case was without
invalid. The IBLA stated that even if the value of the mineral had been quadruoperation would not break even. See also United States v. Cox, 4 IBLA 279 (1972).
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of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified
in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine. The second, the marketability test, recognizes discovery only if the claimant can show that the
mineral can be marketed at a profit. Since the Coleman case, the two rules
have been applied together as a single discovery test for all mineral claims
on public lands. Although the cases recite both tests together, in practice the language of the marketability test is read so broadly that the
analysis actually employed is the prudent man test.
DISCOVERY AND THE WILDERNESS

It would be a mistake to conclude that discovery is easily proved just
because the prudent man test is the test actually applied by the Interior
Department. It is no simple matter to prove that a claim shows a
reasonable prospect of successful development. The vast majority of
claims in cases reviewed by the IBLA are held invalid.
It will probably be more difficult for wilderness claimants to prove
their claims valid than it is for claimants with claims on other public lands.
There are a number of factors associated with wilderness claims which
lessen the likelihood of discovery being proved on these claims. The
January 1, 1984 withdrawal date, the physical remoteness of most
wilderness areas, and Forest Service regulation of exploration and development have surely affected claimants' efforts to establish valid wilderness
claims.
The withdrawal date needs only a short explanation. It was established
under the Wilderness Act and it was incorporated into the management
directives of most national forest wilderness areas of the West. As we have
seen, exploration had to cease upon withdrawal of these areas on January
1, 1984. Wilderness claimants will have to prove discovery based upon
knowledge of their claims amassed by that date.
Wilderness areas are remote, roadless, 1 ' at high elevations and snowbound for most of the year.2"' The work season at such elevations is
short." 3 Such conditions must have made the discovery of most wilderness
claims more difficult than discovery on non-wilderness sites.
Regulation of wilderness exploration and mining merit extensive
discussion by themselves."' Briefly, the Wilderness Act authorizes the
continued application of the Mining Law,
subject, however, to such reasonable regulations governing ingress
and egress as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982).
212. Comment, Wilderness Act andMining: Some Proposalsfor Conservation, 47 ORE.
L. REv. 447, 451 (1968).

213. Id.
214. See Ferguson, ForestService and BLM Wilderness Review Programsand their Ef-

fect on Mining Law Activities, 24 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 717-65 (1978); Haggard, Regulation of Mining Law Activities on FederalLands, 21 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 349-91 (1976);

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 20 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XX

consistent with the use of the land for mineral location and
development and exploration, drilling, and production, and use of
land for transmission lines, waterlines, telephone lines, or facilities
necssary in exploring, drilling, producing, mining, and processing
operations, including where essential the use of mechanized ground
or air equipment and restoration as near as practicable of the surface of the land disturbed in performing, prospecting, [and] location ....
as soon as they have served their purpose."'
Since 1974, the Forest Service has regulated mining activities in all
national forests.1 6 These regulations, applicable to wilderness and nonwilderness areas alike, are broadly stated with general guidelines applicable to all claim situations.
The general language of the regulations permits the Forest Service
to make specific directives for the protection of surface resources on a
claim-by-claim basis.217 In general, the Forest Service applies its regulations more strictly in wilderness than it does in non-wilderness sitHubbard, Ah, Wilderness! (But What A bout Access and Prospecting?),15 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 585-619 (1969); Maley, Mineral Law Since NEPA, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 73-95 (1982);
Miller, Recordationand Surface Management RegulationsAffecting Mining in the National
Forests, the NationalPark System, and on the PublicDomain, 23 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
841-64 (1977); Noble, EnvironmentalRegulation of HardrockMining on PublicLands: Bringing the 1872 Law Up to Date, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 145-63 (1980); Note, Wilderness Act
of 1964-Right to Mine of Those Holding Mineral Claims in Federal Wilderness Areas, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 1215-25 (1974); Short, Wilderness Policies and MineralPotential on the Public
Lands, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 39-73 (1980).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982). The Wilderness Act contains two other provisions concerning regulation of mineral activities. Section 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1982), provides
that activity to gather information about mineral or other resources must be permitted, "if
such activity is carried on in a manner compatible with the preservation of the wilderness
environment." This section clearly allows less exploration activity on wilderness than does
section 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982). In a 1981 memorandum to the Director of the
BLM, the Solicitor advised that the directive of 4(d)(3) should apply until withdrawal on
midnight, December 31, 1983 at which time only such activity permitted by 4(d)(2) would
be permissible. Solicitor's Memorandum, M-36941 (October 19, 1981).
Section 5(b) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1134(5)(b) (1982), authorizes access to
valid claims within wilderness, subject to "reasonable regulations consistent with the preservation of the area as wilderness." The admonition that regulation of access must be "consistent with the preservation of the area as wilderness," is at odds with the directive in 4(d)(3)
that ingress and egress (and other actions involved with mineral activities) shall be subject
to regulation "consistent with the use of the land for mineral location and development and
exploration, drilling, and production .. " 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982). Because means of
access may affect the feasibility (and thus validity) of development prospects, it will be
necessary to resolve these apparently inconsistent provisions as claims are reviewed for determination of validity.
216. 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.1 -. 15 (1983). The Forest Service's authority to regulate activities
connected with mining operations was challenged in United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296
(9th Cir. 1981), and upheld on the basis of the Organic Act. See also United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 19th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); United States v. Curtis
Nevada Mines, 415 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (E.D. Calif.), aff'd in relevant part, 611 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1980) (which upheld the validity of the regulations without discussion).
217. Mining activity in national forests is predicated upon Forest Service approval of
a prospector's or miner's "plan of operation" which, for prospecting, must outline the area
involved, the means of exploration, the period over which the activity is to occur, the manner in which the environment is to be protected, and the existing or proposed access routes
to be used. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(c) (1983). For actual mine development another plan of opera-
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uations. 18 For example, the Forest Service Manual advises foresters to
give special attention to the means of transport and type of equipment
to be approved for wilderness exploration."'
When wilderness claims come under review, after plans of operation
are submitted for mine development, the combination of the exploration
deadline, remoteness, and regulation may prove to have been an insurmountable obstacle to validation efforts.
Establishing the existence of a deposit of sufficient quality and quantity to justify a mine must have been more difficult in wilderness than
in non-wilderness areas. The Forest Service could not have imposed conditions on plans of operation which made exploration impossible: The
statutory right to prospect had to be honored during the period before
withdrawal. Still, the extra care required for protection of sensitive
wilderness sites and the restricted means of access undoubtedly made exploration more time consuming than it would otherwise have been. The
remote location of many wilderness claims must also have affected the
rapidity with which exploration work was accomplished. Moreover, the
work season on claims at high elevations is short."' With such impediments to exploration, an extended timetable was called for. Instead,
explorers labored with the discomforting awareness of the January 1, 1984
deadline.
The recent decision by the IBLA in United States v. Feezor,221 may
be of help to those claimants whose exploration was cut short by the
deadline. A claimant who has not accomplished all his intended exploration work by the deadline, but who has exposed some mineralization of
high quality can employ evidence of geologic inferences in the effort to
prove his deposit valuable. Of course, as the IBLA cautioned in Feezor,
the geologic inferences often fail, as a matter of fact, to prove the extent
of a deposit. But at least, as a matter of law, the claimant is allowed to
advance his case with geologic inferences.
The remote site of a prospect and the Forest Service's regulations and
manual directives can affect a claimant's effort to prove his claim valid
by raising costs of his proposed operation. Costs in developing a wilderness
tion must be submitted for Forest Service approval. In wilderness "the rights of the minerals
claimant must be met with the least possible impact on the wilderness resource." FOREST
SERVICE MANUAL § 2323.7.
A plan of operation approved by the Forest Service is an agreement between the Service and the claimant setting out precisely what activities may be undertaken on a claim,
and how they may be performed. "The operator agrees to observe necessary and reasonable
precautions, spelled out in this plan, to reduce damage to surface resources during operations activities and to rehabilitate disturbed areas when feasible. In turn, the Forest Service agrees that protection of surface resources will be adequate if operations are carried
out in accordance with the approved plan." Mining in the National Forests, U.S.F.S. Current Information Report 14, at 9 (1979).
218. Mining in the National Forests, supra note 217, at 11.
219. See Forest Service Manual §§ 2323.71(a){1), (2), 2817.26.
220. Comment, The Wilderness Act and Mining: Some Proposalsfor Conservation, supra
note 212, at 451.
221. 90 I.D. 262, 74 IBLA 56, (1979).
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claim are bound to be high. Claims on regular national forest lands are
often near established access roads, while those within wilderness areas
are rarely near access roads because wilderness areas, by definition, are
roadless. If a wilderness mine operator needs a road he must build it.2 '
Everything, in fact, must be done "from scratch.""2 3 Further, any special
Forest Service, state, or other statutes and regulations to protect
wilderness qualities can be expected to add to costs. Thus, there must
be a "reasonable prospect" that a wilderness operation can obtain higher
gross profits than would be necessary elsewhere, if the wilderness operation is to be "profitable."
One possible difficulty facing claimants in their efforts to prove their
Wilderness claims valid might arise, not from regulations or the difficulty
of working in remote areas, but from the reluctance of buyers to purchase
the products of a wilderness mine. If a claimant holds a deposit of a mineral
for which there must be shown a captive market, then he may find it difficult, if not impossible, to find a buyer willing to be connected with his
controversial operation. In United States v. Marion,"' the IBLA found
it significant that a prospective buyer cancelled a contract to buy the product of a mine in a sensitive area. The prospective buyer's parent company "did not wish to be involved in the adverse publicity attendant to
exploitation of these claims....-, 5A wilderness claimant may find that
his mineral deposit lacks value because there are no buyers.
In at least one important respect, a wilderness claimant is on the same
footing as any other claimant. Each claimant must satisfy the same burden
of proof in order to show a discovery. From 1913 until 1983 the Interior
Department and the courts had held that evidence of the mineral values
on national forest claims had to be "clear and unequivocal.""2 This rule
was understood to require a greater showing to support national forest
claims than to support claims on other federal land. In the 1983 case, In
re Pacific Coast Molybdenum, an environmental group sought to extend
the higher national forest standard to contested claims in national
monuments. The group contended that a "stronger showing of marketability is required for important recreation areas... than for other public
lands."'7 National forest wilderness areas, by virtue of both their national
forest identity and their recreational value, would surely come under the
rule. The IBLA, however, not only refused to extend this "rule" of evidence
to non-national forest areas, but it repudiated the rule for all areas.
222. In some areas valuable mineral deposits are located just within wilderness. Access
to these deposits will thus be possible from outside the wilderness area, and many development activities, not within the wilderness, may be regulated by the somewhat less strict
supervision to which non-wilderness areas are subject. Deposits in the Cabinet Mountains
may be developed in this manner. A. Haak, Conflicting Demands on a Finite Resource:
Wilderness Preservation v. Mineral Development (1984) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Univ. of
Idaho).
223. Comment, supra note 212, at 451.
224. 37 IBLA 68 (1978.
225. Id at 77-78.
226. United States v. Lavenson, 206 F. 755 (W.D. Wash. 1913); United States v. Wells,
SO-1968-5 (Mining); United States v. Dawson, 58 I.D. 670 (1944).
227. 90 I.D. 352, 361, 75 IBLA 16, 32 (1983).
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The rule had originated in cases involving national forests in which
there were indications that claims were sought as a "mere subterfuge to
acquire title to [mining sites]."22 In those cases the government had required a strong showing that the claimants truly intended to mine. In later
years, the rule "separated from its moorings in considerations of bona
fides" '2 91 and became a rule for a higher standard for claims located in national forests. In Pacific Coast Molybdenum, the IBLA labeled "untenable" the "theory that the situs of the land alters the nature of the test
applied." 30 It added, unequivocally, "where the mining laws apply, they
necessarily apply with equal force and effect, regardless of the characteristics of the land involved. The test of discovery is the same whether the
land be unreserved public domain, land in a national forest, or even land
in a national park." 231 After Pacific CoastMolybdenum, the special status
of a wilderness area should not affect a claimant's burden of proof when
he attempts to prove discovery of a wilderness claim.
Although wilderness claimants need only carry the same burden of
proof as non-wilderness claimants, the practical difficulties inherent in a
wilderness setting are sure to hinder their efforts to validate their claims.
Before withdrawal, wilderness claimants had to gather sufficient evidence
of the physical contents of their claims. These claimants will also have
to prove that the greater costs of wilderness mining will be more than
offset by the price they can obtain for their product on the market. If their
minerals are saleable only on captive markets, then they may be hardpressed to find buyers willing to accept wilderness minerals.
CONCLUSION

We will probably not know for some time whether the mining exception to the Wilderness Act has benefited the mining industry. The time
for wilderness mineral exploration is past, so future plans of operation
submitted to the Forest Service will be for mine development. Determinations of claim validity or invalidity will be made when these plans are
reviewed. It is clear that however one labels the "test" of discovery, proving the location of a valuable mineral deposit will be a difficult undertaking. For some wilderness claims, it may turn out that the modern interpretation of the Mining Law, the Forest Service regulations, and the
limited time allowed for exploration have prevented valid location.
Perhaps it has been a proper development of federal land policy to
require that mining activities, so long in the ascendant position in federal
land use, compete with other concerns. After all, lands that became
statutory wilderness have been open to mining for over a century. During most of that time, mining activities were free of regulation that could
have hampered discovery efforts. Now that these lands are appreciated
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 362, 75 IBLA at 32.
Id. at 363, 75 IBLA at 34.

Id.
Id.
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for their natural state, should not developers pay a higher price for the
right to exploit them for the developers' private benefit?
Present wilderness status does not preclude future development of
mineral deposits. If development proves necessary, then Congress can
remove an area's wilderness status. Wilderness designation preserves
mineral deposits as well as other resources. Mining, on the other hand,
is an act of man and fundamentally incompatible with a concept of a place
"where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man...
undeveloped [and] retaining its primitive character and influence."2'
Where mining occurs wilderness islost. Should not the irreplaceable be
preserved as long as possible? Should it not be reserved from other uses
until there is no alternative?
Representative Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey voiced these concerns
in the 1980 debate on the Central Idaho Wilderness Bill:
Sometimes I feel that those who seek to stop wilderness areas feel
that we are taking the land away and putting it on another planet.
This does not mean that it will not eventually perhaps have
to be used. It just means not now, not yet, and not until it has
to be used.
There is a prudence here. There is a caution, and a conservative
2 33
approach to the uses of the resources of our Nation.
The mineral industry is still much favored. The wilderness mining exception, the special concessions to the industry in some wildernesses, and
even the Mining Law as it is now interpreted, are evidence of that. But
in general federal land policy, it is no longer the favorite. Concern for protection of other resources has steadily eroded its importance. The result
is a balance more accommodating to the needs of present American
society.

232. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982).
233. 126 Cong. Rec. 8052 (1980).
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